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“Thinking I Was I Was Not Who Was Not Was
Not Who”:
The Vertigo of Faulknerian Identity
Philip M. Weinstein
The title is dizzying, and I expect during the next hour to be off- 
balance in a number of ways: off-balance in my moves back and 
forth between character, text, context, reader, and writer; off- 
center in my attempt to decenter our notions of identity itself; 
off-base in my shift from the “legitimate scrutiny of Faulkners 
work to less sanctioned considerations of ideology, psycho­
analysis, and what we in this room are doing when we go to 
conferences like this one and listen to scholarly papers for five or 
six days. These are all issues of identity, I hope to show, and 
thinking about them, I hope also to show, can make you dizzy. I 
turn now to Quentin’s passage in The Sound and the Fury from 
which I take my title quote:
When it bloomed in the spring and it rained the smell was every­
where you didn’t notice it so much at other times but when it rained 
the smell began to come into the house at twilight ... it always 
smelled strongest then until I would lie in bed thinking when will it 
stop when will it stop. The draft in the door smelled of water, a damp 
steady breath. Sometimes I could put myself to sleep saying that 
over and over until the honeysuckle got all mixed up in it the whole 
thing came to symbolise night and unrest I seemed to be lying 
neither asleep nor awake looking down a long corridor of grey 
halflight where all stable things had become shadowy paradoxical all 
I had done shadows all I had felt suffered taking visible form antic 
and perverse mocking without relevance inherent themselves with 
the denial of the significance they should have affirmed thinking I 
was I was not who was not was not who. (210—11)'
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Spurred by the overpowering smell of honeysuckle, Quentins 
thoughts go on to undermine relationships he has based his 
sanity on: the difference between sleep and waking, night and 
day; the inherent connection between things done, felt, suf­
fered, and their significance. The smell of honeysuckle, invading 
him and triggering his unbearable sense of his own and of 
Caddy’s sexuality, breaks down these “stable” connections; and 
Quentin’s attempt to talk himself into tranquility—“saying that 
over and over”—ends by doing the reverse: nothing remains 
itself, all drifts away from its habitual moorings, becoming “shad­
owy paradoxical” as Quentin’s very language—the script by 
which he knows himself—chokes on its quest for coherence, 
dissolving into the babble of “I was I was not who was not was 
not who.”=^ An alien body, a wandering mind, a dizzying sense of 
disowned doings, feelings, and sufferings: these come together 
in this passage as something we call Quentin. He belongs to 
them, but in what sense do they belong to him?
Faulkner’s most powerful strategy for representing this dis­
unity, this incoherence that is Quentin, is, of course, the stream 
of consciousness technique itself Here is Quentin early in the 
chapter:
Because if it were just to hell; if that were all of it. Finished. If things 
just finished themselves. Nobody else there but her and me. If we 
could just have done something so dreadful that they would have fled 
hell except us. I have committed incest I said Father it was I it was 
not Dalton Ames And when he put Dalton Ames. Dalton Ames. 
Dalton Ames. When he put the pistol in my hand I didn’t. That’s 
why I didn’t. He would be there and she would and I would. Dalton 
Ames. Dalton Ames. Dalton Ames. If we could have just done 
something so dreadful and Father said That’s sad too, people cannot 
do anything that dreadful they cannot do anything very dreadful at 
all they cannot even remember tomorrow what seemed dreadful 
today and I said. You can shirk all things and he said, Ah can you. 
And I will look down and see my murmuring bones and the deep 
water like wind, like a roof of wind, and after a long time they cannot 
distinguish even bones upon the lonely and inviolate sand. . . . (97-
98)
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If things just finished themselves: Faulknerian stream of con­
sciousness fiendishly enacts the way in which things do not finish 
themselves. Within this rhetoric Quentin cannot finish his 
thought, cannot finish his identity, cannot keep Dalton Ames 
and Father and Caddy and honeysuckle from penetrating his 
being, cannot keep from quoting his mother, Dilsey, Herbert, 
Mrs. Bland, and others. When his desire to be with Caddy alone 
is denied, his only other desire is to not be, to put an end to all 
this uninvited company that fills his body and mind. Since he 
cannot finish himself he will cancel himself
Let us generalize the model of individual identity implicit in 
Faulkner’s stream of consciousness representation of Quentin. 
Unlike characters in the nineteenth-century novel (which are 
typically passed on to us by the narrator as coherent entities, 
summarized organisms existing over time), Quentin appears as a 
moment-by-moment involuntary recorder of others’ voices, a 
sentient receptacle wounded by the shards of their utterances; 
the site on which the cacophony of the larger culture registers. 
Quentin is a memory-box, a porous container of others’ throw­
away discourse. Unable to consolidate what he has absorbed, 
unable to shape his own thoughts into the coherence of a tem­
poral project, he is a figure in motley. By representing him as 
thus adulterate through and through, made up of what is not 
himself, Faulkner reveals the pathos of his fantasy of preserving 
Caddy’s virginity.
I have spoken only of Quentin, but in a modified form this 
paradigm of identity shapes the other characters of the novel as 
well. Benjy and Jason, Caddy, Mr. and Mrs. Compson; these 
figures are in different ways intolerably penetrated and con­
trolled by formulae not of their own making. 3 Faulkner seems 
drawn to them in the measure that—fissured themselves, in­
debted unknowingly to unworkable scripts—they seek hope­
lessly to impose unity upon, to preserve identity within, their 
own lives and the lives around them. They seek such unity and 
identity through speech, and indeed The Sound and the Fury is 
full of sound, of puny humans contradictorily asserting their own
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authority. It is the loud world, we remember, that Quentin 
would rescue Caddy from.
What is at stake in this desire to preserve identity, this urgent 
need to maintain stable boundaries between the self and the 
world? Why is it so difficult (and for many readers painful) to 
read Quentin’s section? What does it mean that we as readers 
insist on taking all novels—even Faulkner’s and Joyce’s novels— 
as “stories” about individual “characters” engaged in “plot”? 
Indeed, fiction is (like other forms of narrative) a privileged site 
for celebrating the enactment of individual identity. Fiction is 
one of the arenas in which the culture tells its fables of selffiood, 
of the successful negotiation between a self, on the one hand, 
and a world, on the other. And Faulkner’s masterpieces come 
into sharpest focus as a territory in which this negotiation is both 
urgent and impossible, in which the need for protected bound­
aries is exactly as intense as the awareness that these boundaries 
cannot be protected. Virginity, incest, and miscegenation; 
Sutpen’s Hundred, the McCaslin inheritance, and the wilder­
ness—each of these phrases names a crucial Faulknerian space 
(psychic or material) in which boundaries have been hopelessly 
erected or traumatically overrun. What is it that makes these 
enclosed arenas simultaneously precious and beyond preserving?4
* * *
I suggest that identity is a privileged term within a Western 
vocabulary of individualism. In its primary meaning—that some­
thing is always itself—and its secondary implication—that that 
selfhood is different from all others—identity makes some very 
large promises. 5 It promises sameness over time—an unchang­
ing essence at the core of objects (and without which it would be 
difficult to hypothesize about objects at all). That is, the self­
sameness of objects is intrinsic (to be found within the object 
itself) rather than relational (to be found by way of the object’s 
membership within a larger group: its inscription within one or 
several signifying networks). The term suggests, further, with 
respect to human identity, that we are unique creatures, essen­
tially different from each other. To privilege individual identity
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in this way is to fantasize a kind of protected sacred place—the 
place of ourselves—which would be immune to the vicissitudes 
of time and space. It is to allay our anxiety that we may not have 
an unchanging core and therefore may take on our meanings 
from our affiliations and conditions. It is to fix, enclose, and 
affirm our unique difference from others, to say: “That’s who I 
am.” By thus reifying our sense of ourselves, by charting it as a 
separate essence and putting boundaries around it, we repress, 
precisely, that intolerable sense of being-helplessly-caught-up- 
in-the-Other that Faulkner represents in the plight of Quentin 
Compson.
This paradigm of identity as an essentialized sacred space 
commands not just how we want to think of ourselves but how 
we choose to think of art objects as well. The critical position that 
best enshrines it is New Criticism, the model of criticism that 
has been so influential in this country during our century.® Most 
of us in this room who are over forty and under sixty ^ere 
probably trained as New Critics. We learned that depth and 
unique difference are the hallmark of the work of art. Language 
is assumed, within this critical model, to be supremely manage­
able; and each work is to be studied in its precious difference 
from others, each character to be probed in his rounded whole­
ness, each master writer to be praised for the rich inclusiveness 
of his personal vision. (All along the tacit assumption was that 
life, in its murk and messiness, its ideological confusions, could 
not provide such fine-grained distinctions: but art could.)
Close reading was invented and became institutionalized as 
a classroom technique for disengaging the essence, the identity, 
of the aesthetic object. Through close readings the uniqueness of 
the writers vision was identified, and once the individual case 
had been scrupulously delineated, it was seen to partake (para­
doxically) of the universal as well. That is, the unique vision is 
simultaneously, in its wholeness, a universal or human vision. To 
speak of universal or human is to be in touch with essence, with 
that which is lodged so deeply within the individual that it 
escapes the accidents of condition or local affiliation and reflects
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instead something common to the species. In the name of en­
compassing all groups, human actually disavows the power of any 
group to affect the essence of the unique individual.
As spectators in the presence of the human or the universal, 
essences freed by art for our disinterested appreciation, we are 
meant to praise. (How often a New Critical classroom assign­
ment on a poem or a novel could be distilled to the following 
message: praise this object! tell me how finely, disinterestedly, 
inclusively it understands life in its inimitable weave of form and 
content!) The work, exquisitely beyond bias, stands self-com­
plete before us, a microcosm of that ideal identity we would seek 
to posit within ourself: a sacred space. Like us, it may be 
embedded within other, potentially contaminating networks, 
but these networks are secondary. The work’s aesthetic triumph, 
like our own fantasized identity, resides in its free-standing 
wholeness.
I have tried to word this in such a way that you will see the 
connection between how we view the identity of the work of art, 
how we view the writer’s identity, and how we view our own. 
This distinction between the unique and universal, on the one 
hand, and the group-shaped and system-sharing, on the other, 
not only affects Faulkner’s texts: it affects conferences on those 
texts. For the past two years we at this conference have chosen to 
discuss those texts within the “group-shaped” frames of women 
and race, and one of the most urgent (though unspoken) ques­
tions has been: how can we still think of Faulkner as unique and 
universal when it becomes more and more obvious that he is also 
(and not just coincidentally) white and male?
For me, the most revealing moment at last year’s conference 
occurred when a speaker eloquently reflected on potential com­
plexities of motive in two of Faulkner’s characters: the white 
deputy in “Pantaloon in Black” and the black man Jesus in “That 
Evening Sun.” The speaker concluded that these characters, in 
their pain and bewilderment, should be thought of as neither 
white nor black, but instead as human. There was an immediate 
and audible sigh of satisfaction within a great portion of the
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audience, for this conclusion spoke to our continuous anxiety 
about racial differenc^spoke to it by transcending all group 
differences and arriving at species universality, at the human. Yet 
what black reader of Faulkner will find it more illuminating to 
see that white deputy as human rather than white (white here as 
crucial limitation and blindness), and what woman reader will 
want to see Jesus (who has beaten Nancy before and may now be 
about to slit her throat) as human rather than male (male here as 
crucial limitation and blindness)? The white deputy and Jesus 
act deeply out of their group identity—their race and gender— 
and to see them as essentially human is to obscure into sec­
ondariness the massive role played by race and gender.
I should say, in closing this anecdote, that a woman came up 
after the talk to quarrel with the speaker’s interpretation of 
Jesus, and I (who had also come up) raised a question with him 
about “human” but defended his gender reading. In the year’s 
interim between then and now I have been pondering this 
event—it was in fact the germ of this entire paper and the 
speaker and I have, since then, discussed together as well the 
elusive impress of ideology upon interpretation. For my part, I 
now see that the talk and the later disagreements were all of 
them instances of the legitimate shaping power of race and 
gender. As a white male, the speaker could see something m 
Jesus that a black reader might not see (he being focused on a 
racial context that the white reader might see beyond); likewise 
the woman with a quarrel had a quarrel: she as a woman was 
more interested in reading Jesus within a gender context that 
was for her primary, not secondary, though for the white male 
speaker the gender context might well seem secondary to an 
existentialist one. And I now realize that a Marxist might have 
come up to the podium and legitimately quarreled with us all, 
his focus arising from a matrix of class and economic issues that 
we had all scanted.
The point is that there are no universal texts, no universal 
readings of them. Each text, like each reading of the text, 
achieves its power through its omissions: seeing some things is
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predicated upon blindness to others. The text, like the reader, is 
caught up in a variety of unchosen networks; it is inextricably 
part of its time and its place. Its identity is inevitably adulterate 
and problematic, a function both of its angle of vision upon the 
world and of the readers angle of vision upon it.'^Roland Barthes 
makes this point shrewdly in his essay on that “universal” 
bestseller entitled The Family of Man.7 Barthes notes that this 
photographic celebration of our universally shared destiny—that 
all over the world we are alike in being born, in growing up, in 
working and playing, in growing old and dying—manages sys­
tematically to repress a countertruth: that we are born into 
different conditions, we grow up with different possibilities, we 
have different work and play options (depending on what part of 
the world we inhabit and our class orientation), we die at dif­
ferent ages and of different diseases (depending on the culture 
we live in).® This countertruth is attentive to the differential of 
history, whereas The Family of Man focuses upon the immu­
tability of nature. Both points of view are valuable, but only one 
concedes that it is a point of view. The Family of Man passes itself 
off as unedited pictures of nature, of the obvious: as how things 
are.
The text that claims to be universal posits, then, an unchang­
ing human truth, an essential identity uncontaminated by the 
accidents of time, place, and affiliation. Free of bias, it asks to be 
taken as a privileged portrait of how things are. 9 Such a text was, 
I think, the object of study of New Criticism, and there is 
something in us that still seeks to read Faulkner in this way. I 
want now to posit another model of identity—this one drawing 
on the Marxist philosopher Althusser and the psychoanalytic 
theorist Lacan—and then to consider both Absalom, Absalom! 
and the activity of this conference from the perspective of this 
new model.
* * *
Althusser is interested in the paradox at the heart of the term 
subject.The subject is simultaneously the free human being
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and the human being subjected to another s system of beliefs and 
practices. Ideology is the missing term that enables this paradox, 
for ideological practice and the free human subject mutually 
constitute each other. “The category of the subject,” writes 
Althusser, “is the constitutive category of all ideology . . . insofar 
as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of constituting 
concrete individuals as subjects.What this means is that we 
obtain our sense of uncoerced, unpredictable inwardness 
through our spontaneous assent to the social scripts the ide­
ologies—that surround us. We assent immediately, to arrange­
ments so self-evident as to be invisible, and indeed all well­
functioning ideology is invisible in this sense. It is what goes 
without saying, it is our daily participation in a “natural” schema 
of how things are, our way of wearing our name, our clothes, our 
unconscious convictions about the rightness of our procedures.
But we do not generate name, clothes, and convictions out of 
ourselves. They may be the material of our identity, but they 
come to us from outside, as always already established and 
awaiting our spontaneous participation. We join in by accepting 
the models thus proposed. As men or women we accept some 
socially proposed gender image, if we are Christians we accept 
Christ, if we are Americans we accept some version of the 
founding fathers, if we are teachers we pursue some compelling 
image of teaching. In each case we become ourselves by subject­
ing ourselves to a commanding image: we achieve our freedom 
by internalizing an external model. Althusser calls this model 
ideology, a script whose acceptance ushers us into a particular 
version of social reality, a version that we enact insofar as we 
remain faithful to the gestures, practices, and beliefs sanctioned 
by the script. The key to this model is noncoercion: “the indi­
vidual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall 
(freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the 
gestures and actions of his subjection all by himself.
Identity on this model is decentered. We spontaneously (in­
deed unconsciously) subscribe to social scripts that thus em­
power us. They do empower us, yet they are not quite the same
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thing as us. Is it too much to say that Faulknerian tragedy is 
generated precisely by the civil war between these internalized 
social scripts and a something within the self more primordial 
than social scripts? I turn now to Jacques Lacan for a discussion 
of this something more primordial.
According to Lacan we come into our identity only through a 
series of alienations, and the earliest ones are decisive. ^3 The 
infant, speechless {infans means speechless), absorbs from its 
first days bits and pieces of language into itself, and it absorbs as 
well the gaze of others. What it knows in addition is the sensa­
tion of disconnected body parts; it has as yet no totalizing image 
of itself This momentous step occurs during what Lacan calls 
the mirror stage: that moment (Lacan sees it beginning roughly 
at the sixth month and continuing for another year) when the 
infant begins to “recognize” itself as reflected either through the 
eyes of its mother or in an actual mirror. The resultant external 
image is perceived as a totality—a completed self—and it con­
trasts richly, in its wholeness and mobility, with the infant’s own 
interior sense of physical uncoordination and turbulent body 
parts. In other words, the infant recognizes itself only in an alien 
image of wholeness. Lacan writes: “the total form of the body by 
which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his 
power is given to him only ... in an exteriority. ” ^4 Or, as he 
puts it more simply, “the first synthesis of the ego is essentially 
alter ego; it is alienated.’’^5
This first moment of coherent self-knowing is thus a “mirage, ” 
and it prefigures the process of unconscious identificatory merg­
ing with outer objects that will, for the rest of our lives, affect our 
identity as subjects. Lacan calls this dimension of identity Imagi­
nary. As one of Lacan’s commentators writes, “The ego is de­
veloped in a primordial discordance between natural being and 
identification with the forms of the oter world. In other words, 
alien images—i.e., not innate—first constitute the ego as an 
object of its own identificatory mergers. The self is thus 
“constituted through anticipating what it will become,”^7 built 
upon fictions.
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The second stage of identity-formation begins at about eigh­
teen months: the time at which the child simultaneously begins 
to acquire language skills and to recognize the invisible presence 
of the father as a barrier to its desire for merger with the mother. 
Reconceiving Freud’s Oedipal drama, Lacan sees the child’s 
entry into language as itself a substitute satisfaction for the lost 
object—the mother—that the infant shall never again possess. 
Language appears in this argument as an alien network made up 
of empty differences, of signs that mean only in relation to each 
other; it is a system outside the self Henceforth caught up in 
this system (which Lacan calls the Symbolic—the paternal field 
of Culture’s rules and regulations, of linguistic transactions, of 
the Law), the child is doomed to seek in the register of language 
and its concepts a wholeness that language by definition cannot 
\provide. Language keeps sending us to other language. Thus we 
spend our lives trying to say what we want, chasing in the 
channel of language for an object that never existed in that 
currency in the first place.
These two stages of self-formation posit an inevitable self- 
fissuring. The human subject is a being precariously poised 
between Imaginary mergers and Symbolic distinctions; he does 
not master either arena. Identity is therefore decentered and 
from the beginning adulterate; there is no native self As Lacan 
writes, “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not 
think. Or, “clarifying ” himself, he writes: “I am not wherever 
I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do 
not think to think.”^9 Or, “clarifying” Lacan, we might say: 
“Thinking I was I was not who was not was not who. ” In each 
formulation we remain, it seems, the last ones to know exactly 
what we are up to, though Faulkner’s wording has an urgency 
and a sense of the cost of such vertigo absent from Lacan’s 
complacent phrasing. In any event, the social world—its lan­
guage, its gestures, its images—penetrates us from the moment 
of our birth on: we have never been virginal. Drawing on Al­
thusser and Lacan as formulators of a human subject inextricably
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and irrationally permeated by social networks—a human subject 
who lives his identity both through participating in ideology and 
through primordial Imaginary mergers with the others that sur­
round him—I turn now to Absalom, Absalom!
* * ^
Faulkner almost surely knew nothing of either Althusser or 
Lacan, yet Absalom, Absalom! uncannily responds to their en­
terprises. The ways in which individuals are born into alien 
systems of thinking, feeling, and doing—into ideology—and at 
the same time find themselves caught up in a primordial fusion 
with others in whom they see themselves mirrored: these con­
cerns seem to lie near the heart of the book. As John Irwin has 
argued, individual identity in this novel is a matter not of en­
closed essences but of specular relationships.^®
The process of vicarious identification is rampant. Rosa and 
her identification with Judith and Charles’s courtship, Henry and 
his shifting triangular identifications with Judith and with Bon, 
Sutpen’s identification with the planter in the big house. Wash 
Jones’s identification with Sutpen, Quentin and Shreve’s identifi­
cations with Henry and Charles: in each of these crossings an 
involuntary psychic merger takes place—across “the devious 
intricate channels of decorous ordering ” (139), the boundaries 
set up by Culture that tell whom we are like and whom unlike, 
whom we can or cannot touch, where, and when. The novel’s 
primary image for this desire for merger is touch itself, just as 
the novel’s primary image for the cultural prohibition against 
touch is the closed door.
Individual identity here remains poignantly incomplete. Even 
Charles Bon, in Quentin and Shreve’s final version of him, finds 
himself moving past the cool stability of “breathing, pleasure, 
darkness” (300) and into the helpless state of yearning. Needing 
his father’s recognition and not getting it he thinks, “My God, I 
am young, young, and I didn't even know it; they didn’t even tell 
me, that I was young” {^21). I Absalom, Absalom! insists on the
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same kind of fluid incompleteness in its very form. Revising each 
finished version of its characters’ identity with another version, 
the novel melts down whatever it has consolidated, infusing 
youthful instability and passion into materials gone rigid or 
dead. “Get on, now . . . But go on . . . Go on ” (260-61)—these 
instigating phrases run like a leitmotif throughout the narrative, 
fanning the glow of its stalemated materials into the bonfire of an 
overpass to love, heating up painful but finished events into 
unbearably unfinished ones. Gharles Bon enters this novel dead, 
is brought back to life, is shot, is resurrected, is shot again, is 
resurrected again, is shot again. Each time he dies it hurts a bit 
more, hurts Quentin and Shreve who have lent him something of 
themselves, hurts the reader who has lent Quentin and Shreve 
(and therefore Charles) something of the reader’s self The nar­
rative keeps revisiting its most intransigent materials, rejuvenat­
ing and replaying them as a living might-be, then as a meditative 
might-have-been, then as a tragic was.
In this creative move to revise its own inheritance, this tor­
mented overview of its own wasted terrain, Absalom goes past an 
Althusserian vision of ideological consent. It does so through the 
resurrectory energy of desire itself, the energy that psycho­
analysis respects as transference and that moves through the 
incompleteness of individual identity—that of the doers, the 
tellers, the readers—and merges with the other. Rather than 
accept the limitations of a narrative in which everything has 
already happened—the conventional historical novel—or accept 
the illusion of a narrative in which everything is yet to happen— 
the conventional novel of today, Faulkner combines these two 
frames into a narrative of tragic desire. 4]vents come to us in the 
double perspective of having already happened, and yet—such 
is the desire of the teller—they are rekindled, still happening, 
being reimagined, reframed, compelling yet hopeless. This is 
the narrative of desire entrapped—can’t matter—and desire re­
leased—must matter, of “they mought have kilt us but they aint 
whupped us yit” (184).
The Vertigo of Faulknerian Identity 185
Such involuntary mergers recall the Lacanian field of the 
Imaginary—the movement of “the immortal brief recent intran­
sient blood” (295)—in defiance of the boundaries put forth by 
the Symbolic order. Those boundaries, though, are beyond dis­
mantling, and not because the authorities dispense enough po­
lice to protect them. They are beyond dismantling because 
internalized, bred into the very fabric of the individuals uncon­
scious feeling and thinking. Henry Sutpen polices himself His 
West Virginia father may touch blacks with impunity but, born 
and bred in the South, Henry cannot. He screams and vomits 
when his father does it, he murders at the intolerable prospect of 
his sister doing it. As Althusser claims, ideology is inseparable 
from subjecthood itself, and Faulkner tirelessly shows us—in 
Quentin Compson, in Joe Christmas, in Charles Etienne Saint- 
Valery Bon—the dissolution of the subject that follows upon the 
clash within of incompatible ideological scripts.
All great novels involve the clash of ideological scripts, but 
most do not represent that clash as beyond individual resolution. 
Indeed, as I suggested earlier, fiction is a privileged terrain for 
the successful negotiation of self and society, for the persuasive 
imagining of individual identity working its way through con­
flicts both Imaginary and ideological/1 would hazard that every 
best-seller, one way or another, affirms a dominant ideology even 
as it points to its rupture or blind spots. Let us consider, for 
example, the ways in which two masterpieces written in 1936— 
Absalom, Absalom! and Gone with the Wind—play out this issue 
of ideological rupture and containment in terms of individual 
identity. “
Narrative voice is the novel’s most potent instrument for con­
tainment—for conveying the sense of an individual speaker in 
control of the conflicts that arise—and Gone with the Wind 
comes to us in an uninterrupted and exquisitely satisfying nar­
rative voice, a voice everywhere equal to its task, a voice that 
knows. Absalom, Absalom! comes to us, by contrast, in a variety 
of voices, and the fact that they all sound alike doesn’t help us
i86 PHILIP M. WEINSTEIN
out. Each of these voices either knowingly or unknowingly calls 
into question its own authority. This is a case in which more is 
less.
If we move to the handling of time and theme, we find a 
comparable stability in the best-seller, instability in the experi­
mental novel. All of Gone with the Wind is written as though the 
past history it is unfolding took place just a few days ago: the 
novel never acknowledges its own seventy-five-year vantage 
point on the events it records—the pastness of the past. (It 
doesn’t acknowledge it but it everywhere exploits it in the 
unified vision afforded by retrospect.) Mitchell renders the de­
feat of the South as tragic, deserved, and—more to the point— 
secondary. She does this by focusing the reader less upon the 
issues of the war itself than upon two larger-than-life figures 
(Rhett and Scarlet) who stand neither simply for nor against the 
lost cause. The trauma of the war, the ways in which it called into 
question (still calls into question) our nation’s deepest communal 
identity, is thus contained within Scarlet and Rhett’s “immortal ” 
love story, ending on the note of the unvanquished human will, 
the staying power of individual identity. (A comparison of the 
place of Tara and of Sutpen’s Hundred within the economy of 
each novel’s ending makes the same point.)
Absalom, Absalom! by contrast, lives uneasily on both sides of 
Mitchell’s satisfying time frame. In Absalom the pastness of the 
past—its unrecoverability—is foregrounded. Yet the past has 
refused, precisely, to pass: it is still present, still unfinished, still 
beyond managing. 1808, 1833, 1859, 1865, 1909-10: the nar­
rative moves bewilderingly back and forth among these times, 
suggesting that the racial issues over which the war was fought 
retain their power to haunt and confuse: who is black in Absalom? 
how much black blood does it take to be black? In place of Gone 
with the Wind’s easy separation between black blacks and white 
whites, Absalom finds black and white to be inextricable parts of 
each other’s identity.
Gone with the Wind “masters ” the trauma of the Civil War, 
then, by containing it within a love story of two strong individu-
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als, narrated by a coherent and capable narrative voice, one 
which keeps intact key distinctions between white and black, 
self and system, past and present, energy and weakness; distinc­
tions upon which twentieth-century American culture’s most 
confident images of itself are founded. In Absalom all these 
distinctions have become problematic. No narrator can deliver 
this material because none has mastered it. None can speak from 
a later cultural vantage point of superior hindsight and sort it all 
out. And this means literally that the culture since 1865 has been 
unable to provide the narrators with a perspective—a consoling 
ideology—that will make that cataclysmic war go down. It sticks 
in the craw, and in so doing it shatters the conventional fictional 
contract between self and society. Absalom is an experimental 
novel, precisely, in its refusal of these blandishments, these 
conventions of retrospective mastery.^Its frustrations are passed 
on to us as our own; we do not feel wise reading it, we do not feel 
sure of ourselves—of who we are—while reading it. ^3
In fact, Faulkner’s novel (as opposed to Mitchell’s) seems 
designed to frustrate our answer to the simple question that
inaugurates all queries about identity: who is---------? who is
'Thomas Sutpen? who is Charles Bon? who is Quentin Compson? 
It is not that the question cannot be answered but that the novel 
keeps on answering it in different ways. Thomas Sutpen is a 
demon, a tragic hero, a successful planter; he is also a psychically 
arrested child, a mountain man, white trash. Who he is depends 
on when and where you look at him, and who is doing the 
looking. He looks one way to a woman, another to a man, 
another to a disowned son, another to a disillusioned classicist, 
another to his quietly desperate son, another to a Canadian. 
These competing views of Sutpen’s identity do not embarrass the 
novel; they enable it. Character in Absalom lives openly in 
someone else’s talk; there is no illusion here of unmediated 
identity, of identity as enclosed essence. ^4 A different narrator, a 
different issue (miscegenation, say, rather than incest) produces 
a different identity.
What indeed is Absalom, Absalom! “itself ”? Is it the material
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378 pages within the Modern Library covers that most of us 
know? John Irwin has shown its astonishing intertextually shared 
life with The Sound and the Fury. Less spectacularly, Noel Polks 
new edition of The Sound and the Fury indicates the difficulty of 
containing any text within its material bounds. Consider the 
history of The Sound and the Fury’s Appendix. ^5 To do so, we 
should first go forward to Absalom, Absalom!, for in concluding 
that novel in the mid-1930s Faulkner composed a chronology, a 
genealogy, and a map. Charmed, perhaps, by the illusion of 
containment that such instruments convey, Faulkner went on to 
write—some ten years later—an Appendix to The Sound and the 
Fury, liking it so much that he argued for its appearance at the 
beginning of the novel. (Probably half of you in this room first 
encountered the novel, as I did, in this format, joined with As I 
Lay Dying.) For sixteen years this text held sway; then, at the 
time of Faulkners death, a new edition appeared with the Ap­
pendix placed more discreetly at the end of the novel proper. 
Some twenty-two years later, in 1984, under the supervision of 
Noel Polk, the most recent edition of The Sound and the Fury 
appeared, this time altogether without the Appendix. Which is 
The Sound and the Fury? If I have told the story properly, you 
will find the question sounding now a bit naive. The amount of 
critical exigesis dependent upon the originally absent and now 
discarded Appendix is weighty indeed, and it is not limited to 
undergraduates who don’t know better. There are, I conclude, 
several Sound and Furys afloat (not that they are all of equal 
value), and whichever we prefer changes in yet other ways when 
we try to calculate its interaction with Absalom, Absalom!
* * *
Character and text not only exhibit changing identities; liter­
ary history is founded upon such changes. We all know relevant 
examples: the Romantics’ Milton (of the Devil’s party without 
knowing it) is not the Milton of the seventeenth century; T. S. 
Eliot’s inauguration of John Donne as a major poet removes him
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from his Elizabethan context and places him in Eliot’s ongoing 
battle with Wordsworth and Tennyson; Jane Eyre as reconceived 
by contemporary feminists is a text of the 1970s as much as of the 
1840s; Uncle Tom’s Cabin goes from best-sellerdom in the 1850s 
to obscurity for a hundred years and back into acclaim once 
again, now being enlisted in the contemporary battle against 
Modernist canons of race, gender, form, and theme; D. H. 
Lawrence, once one of the four or five twentieth-century dar­
lings of survey courses of English literature, is at present disap­
pearing silently from our syllabi.
These are not capricious changes. They testify to the fact that 
we do not so much receive literary masterpieces, intact, as 
produce them, adulterate.^® The identity of texts is not essential 
but contextual; their value is inescapably conditioned by current 
canons of assessment. No writer comes to us “as he is,” not even 
Faulkner. How can we see him except through the interpretive 
eyes of Sartre and Malraux, or Olga Vickery, or Cleanth Brooks, 
or John Irwin, or John Matthews—^which is to say through the 
concomitant lenses of Sartre and Malraux’s existentialism, Vick­
ery’s New Criticism, Brooks’s sympathy with Southern culture, 
Irwin’s Nietzsche and Freud, Matthews’s Derrida? I have in this 
sentence immersed Faulkner within a fog of names, yet this is, 
whether we are conscious of it or not, the only access we have to 
him. “Faulkner” is misleading shorthand for a complex and 
many-voiced enterprise that operates under the cover of his 
name.
Individual identity is likewise misleading shorthand for a eom- 
plex and many-voiced enterprise that operates under the cover 
of that phrase. So long as we are physically separate from each 
other, demonstrably lodged in separate bodies, we shall prob­
ably never coneede the degree to which we depend upon the 
other and upon system in order to eonstitute the self. Equally, so 
long as we look solid, we shall deny the terrifying extent of our 
liquidity. Yet it is, so to speak, the liquid in us—what Faulkner 
calls the blood—that engages incessantly in acts of transference, 
of identificatory merger. Because our identity is perpetually
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unfinished, because we are never coincident with ourselves, we 
read books, teach students, and attend Faulkner conferences.
I have been using the pronoun “we” with abandon, but the 
“we” in this room is no common entity. Our orientations are here 
as well, invisibly differentiating us from some and joining us to 
others. Indeed, many of us are wearing a badge conspicuously 
placed upon our person, and this badge tells an interesting story. 
It says that we are here in our discrete bodies but not only here; 
we are also there, lodged in our former affiliations (and if the 
badge says Berkeley it suggests something different from Buf­
falo, something different again from Swarthmore or Ole Miss). 
We speak out of those affiliations, and are heard in terms of 
them, as we speak out of and are heard in terms of our race and 
gender.
Yet we do come together under a common umbrella that is 
appropriately named “Faulkner. ” It is the site less of our individ­
ual than of our transpersonal professional activity. Many of us are 
rewarded—either figuratively or literally—for coming to these 
conferences and attending thus to our place in the Symbolic field 
of reputations and responsibilities. Prestige and power, in how­
ever small a degree, are at stake. In addition, and more agreea­
bly, “Faulkner” serves as a sort of absent father who enables 
fleeting sibling relations among erstwhile strangers spending a 
week together in each others company. Not kin, we do, becanse 
of him, for moments feel like kin. I’ll close by suggesting, 
however, that this conference is the site as well, and perhaps 
more profoundly, of our common acts of imaginary transference, 
the locus of our hopeless desire to merge our incompleteness 
with Faulkner’s beckoning authority. Dead, he lives. Continually 
re-invented, he speaks to us. “Freed ... of time and flesh, 
like old Colonel Sartoris or Colonel Sutpen, he broods over us all 
in the form of our impassioned and incompatible inventions of 
him.
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NOTES
1. I cite from the 1962 Vintage edition of The Sound and the Fury and from the 1951 
Modem Library edition of Absalom, Absalom!
2. The best full-length study of Faulknerian psychic stmctures menaced by pressures they 
cannot control is Gail L. Mortimer’s phenomonological Faulkners Rhetoric of Loss (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1983), Andre Bleikasten’s The Most Splendid Failure (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1976) recurs frequently to this concern. See especially the chapters on 
Quentin, 90-143, For a reading of this vertigo in terms of the play of difference and deferral 
inherent in the system of language itself see John Matthews, The Play of Faulkners Language 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
3. Bleikasten is acute on Jason’s enclosure within the social stereotypes of his region: “His 
ideas are all second-hand, and . . . they all come from the threadbare ideology of his cultural 
environment ” (164).
4. For further discussion of the idea of “sanctuary, ” see my “ Precarious Sanctuaries: 
Protection and Exposure in Faulkner’s Fiction, ” Studies in American Fiction, 6 (1978), 173-91.
5. Judith Egan Gardiner’s “On Female Identity and Writing by Women” in Elizabeth 
Abel, ed., Writing and Sexual Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) provides 
an excellent overview of psychoanalytic models of identity from Freud through Erikson and 
Chodorow. The problematic of individual identity is, of course, a common theme of post- 
stmcturalist, psychoanalytic, and Marxist criticism.
6. Ihe preeminent spokesmen of New Criticism—^Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom, 
Cleanth Brooks, and William Wimsatt, to name four—^have decisively shaped the institutional 
study of literature in this country since the 1930s; their major texts are sufficiently well-known 
not to require identification here. For critical assessments of their enterprise, see Frank 
Lentricchia, After The New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Terry 
Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford, Eng.: Blackwell, 1983), and William E. 
Cain, The Crisis in Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
7. Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957), trans. Annette Levers (New York: HiU and Wang, 
1972), 100-102.
8. Barthes writes: “Any classic humanism postulates that in scratching the history of men a 
little, the relativity of their institutions or the superficial diversity of their skins (but why not ask 
the parents of Emmet Till, the young Negro assassinated by the Whites what they think of The 
Great Family of Man?), one very quickly reaches the sofid rock of a universal human nature ” 
(101).
9. Survey courses of English literature find it difficult to avoid the same idealist perspec­
tive. The “pageantry” of masterpieces fiom Beowulf to Virginia Woolf emerges as a sequence of 
works that resemble nothing so much as each other in their fine-grained and unbiased 
universality. The differential history that occasions the production and reception of all these 
works is marginalized in such courses, if not repressed.
10. The central Althusser text for my purposes is “Ideology and Ideological State Appara­
tuses,” in his Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971). The 
major attempt to produce an Althusserian model of literary theory is Pierre Macherey ’s Pour une 
Theorie de la production litteraire (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1966). The work of Terry Eagleton 
and of Fredric Jameson is considerably indebted to both Althusser and Macherey. See especially 
Eagleton’s Criticism and Ideology (London: New Left Books, 1976) and Jameson’s The Political 
Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 9-102. Other useful commentary on 
Althusser includes Tony Bennett’s Formalism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1979); James 
Kavanaugh’s “Marxism’s Althusser: Toward a Politics of Literary Theory, ” in diacritics, 12 (1982), 
25—45; William Dowling’s Jameson, Althusser, Marx (Ith^^a: Cornell University Press, 1984).
11. Althusser, 171.
12. Ibid., 182.
13. The most useful collection of Lacan’s major essays in translation remains Ecrits: A 
Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977). The essay most relevant to this 
portion of my argument is “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I, ” 1-7. Lacan’s
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work is notoriously difficult, and I have benefited greatly by the following discussions: Anika 
Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Fredric 
Jameson, “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan,” in Shoshana Felman, ed.. Literature and 
Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Lfniversity Press, 1982), 338-95; Luce Irigaray, 
Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un (Paris: Minuit, 1977); Jane Gallop, The Daughter’s Seduction (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), and her Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); 
and Elbe Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1986),
14. Lacan, 2.
15. Lacan, Seminaire 3, as quoted by Ragland-Sullivan, 275,
16. Ragland-Sullivan, 2.
17. Gallop, Reading Lacan, 81.
ik Lacan, 166.
19. Ibid,
20. Irwin, Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1975).
21. The best work I know of on the role of desire in the production of literary texts is that of 
Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot (New York: Knopf 1984), and of Charles Bemheimer, 
‘Toward a Psychopoetics of the Text,” in his Flaubert and Kafka (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), 1-44,
22. Eric Sundquist touches briefly on this comparison in his Faulkner: The House Divided 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), Peter Brooks brilliantly explores the 
logic of the intertwined Mure of narrative and genealogical authority in his “Incredulous 
Narration: Absalom, Absalom!" in Comparative Literature, 34 (1982), 247-68.
23. Not enough critical attention is generally paid to the sense of readerly empowerment or 
incapacity wrought by a given texts “narrative contract.” Insofar as a narrative invokes (in its 
forms even more than its themes) the comforts of the already-known, it consolidates the 
ideological bonding between reader and culture: it makes one feel rich in common wisdom. 
Virginia Woolfs commentary in A Room of One’s Own (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
1957) on this aspect of reading is unsurpassable:
But the effect [of an unconventional text that the narrator is reading] was somehow baffling; 
one conld not see a wave heaping itself a crisis coming round the next comer. Therefore I 
could not plume myself either upon the depths of my feelings and my profound knowledge of 
the human heart. For whenever I was about to feel the usual things in the usual places, al»ut 
love, about death, the annoying creature twitched me away, as if the important thing were just 
a little further on. And thus she made it impossible for me to roll out my sonorous phrases 
about “elemental feelings,” the “common stuff of humanity,” “depths of the human heart,” 
and all those other phrases which support us in our belief that, however clever we may be on 
top, we are very serious, very profound and very humane underneath. She made me feel, on 
the contrary, that instead of being serious and profound and humane, one might be—^and the 
thought was far less seductive—merely lazy minded and conventional into the bargain. (95)
24. John Matthews richly opens up this dimension of characterization in his chapter on 
Absalom, Absalom! in The Play of Faulkner’s Language. For a study of the ways in which the 
novel’s entire representational project is dependent upon voice, see also Stephen M. Ross, “The 
Evocation of Voice in Absalom, Absalom!,’’ in Essays in Literature, 8 (1981), 135-49.
25. Noel Polk discusses these issues at length in his Editorial Handbook on The Sound and 
the Fury. In a telephone discussion of 3 July 1987 Noel Polk spoke to me of some of Faulkner’s 
reasons in the mid-forties for wanting to give a privileged position to the Appendix, yet without 
“pandering ” to those who would refuse to struggle with the body of the text itseE
26. To Marx’s question, “Where does the eternal charm of Greek art come from? ” Etienne 
Balibar and Pierre Macherey respond as follows:
There is no good answer to this question, quite simply because there is no eternal charm in 
Greek art: for the Iliad, a fragment of universal literature, used in this instance as a vehicle for 
memory, is not the Iliad produced by the material life of the Greeks, which was not a ‘book’ 
nor even a ‘myth’ in our sense of the word, which we would like to apply retrospectively. 
Homer’s Iliad, the ‘work’ of an author’ exists only for us, and in relation to new material
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conditions into which it has been reinscribed and reinvested with a new significance, , , . To 
go further; it is as if we ourselves had written it (or at least composed it anew). Works of art are 
processes and not objects, for they are never produced once and for all, but are continually 
susceptible to ‘reproduction’: in feet, they only find an identity and a content in this continui 
process of transformation. There is no eternal art, there are no fixed and immutable works. 
(Quoted in Bennett, Formalism and Marxism, 68)
27. William Faulkner, Sartoris (New York: Signet, 1964), 19.
